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DEFAMATION: "MOUTHPIECE" LIBEL CLAIM FAILS
TO SPEAK FOR ITSELF
Sticks and stones may break bones, but Milton Rudin, an attorney
whose clients include many of the world's most famous entertainers,'
thought names were what had harmed him. In Rudin v. Dow Jones &
Co. ,2 a recent defamation suit, the court held that Rudin failed to sustain
his burden of proving that a magazine had printed a caption which the
average reader would understand as defamatory.3
Defamation is an invasion of one's interest in reputation; it may be
either in the form of libel or slander.4 Libel includes the more permanent
forms of defamatory matter: writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other
fixed visual representations.' Slander is the more transitory form. It is
generally restricted to oral statements and gestures.6
In any action for defamation the plaintiff must prove that the matter
complained of is 1) defamatory, 2) refers to the plaintiff, and 3) has been
published to a third person.7 Proving that something is actually defama-
tory is the most complicated; consequently, most litigation centers on
this element.
Dow Jones & Co. ("Dow") publishes Barron's Business and Finan-
cial Weekly ("Barron's"). On November 27, 1978, Barron's commented
on the fact that Rudin and client Frank Sinatra ("Sinatra") had
purchased a substantial amount of stock in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co. The article speculated as to the reasons Rudin and Sinatra had in-
vested in the company and, rather sarcastically, pointed out that the ac-
tion was far removed from gambling, Atlantic City, Las Vegas and show
1. Elizabeth Taylor, Richard Burton, Bob Hope, George Bums, Burt Lancaster, Lucille
Ball, Liza Minelli and others have been represented by Milton Rudin. Rudin v. Dow Jones &
Co., 557 F. Supp. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
2. 557 F. Supp. 535.
3. Id. at 543.
4. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 at 737 (4th ed. 1971).
5. CAL. CIv. CODE § 45 (West 1982) states that "[libel is a false and unprivileged publi-
cation by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which ex-
poses any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned
or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." See also Dethlefsen v.
Stull, 86 Cal. App. 2d 499, 195 P.2d 56 (1948) (letter charging that former partner was an
undesirable associate because he was dishonest in financial dealings was libelous).
6. CAL. CIv. CODE § 46 (West 1982). See also Semple v. Andrews, 27 Cal. App. 2d 228,
81 P.2d 203 (1938) (evangelist defamed by article that injured her reputation and occupation).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
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biz.'
Rudin wrote a letter to the editor defending the purchase as a lucra-
tive business deal and denouncing Barron's for insinuating that he and
Sinatra were only capable of understanding gambling stocks and the en-
tertainment industry. The letter was published with the added caption
"SINATRA'S MOUTHPIECE" on January 15, 1979. 9
Rudin's law firm telegrammed Barron's the next day and protested
that the caption defamed and impugned Rudin's professional reputation.
The telegram demanded that the magazine print a retraction. In the Jan-
uary 22 issue, the editor commented on Rudin's objection to the caption
and stated: "We meant to cast no aspersions on Mr. Rudin. Our diction-
ary defines 'mouthpiece' as 'spokesman.' o10
Rudin brought a defamation action against Barron's in the United
States District Court." Under New York law a publication is libelous
per se, therefore actionable as defamatory without pleading or proving
special damages,1 2 if it tends to disparage a person's business, office, pro-
fession or trade. 3 Dow moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that
"Sinatra's Mouthpiece" was simply not susceptible of any defamatory
meaning. 4 After hearing a wealth of evidence from both sides, the court
denied the motion and concluded that Rudin had established that "Sina-
tra's Mouthpiece" was at least capable of a defamatory meaning.
Whether in fact the phrase actually conveyed the meaning was a jury
question. '"
The parties went ahead without a jury and in 1983 found themselves
again before the District Court in a proceeding that really amounted to a
battle of evidence.
Rudin called three prominent attorneys to testify that "Sinatra's
8. Rudin, 557 F. Supp. at 536.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 536-37.
11. Rudin v. Dow Jones & Co., 510 F. Supp. 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
12. This is distinguished from libel per quod by the fact that libel per se is indisputably
defamatory on its face without the aid of any extrinsic evidence. Diplomat Electric, Inc. v.
Westinghouse Electric Supply Co., 378 F.2d 377. (5th Cir. 1967).
13. Nichols v. Item Publishers, Inc., 309 N.Y. 596, 600-01, 132 N.E.2d 860, 861-62 (1956)
(church pastor only proved falsity of article, not defamation).
14. The motion was made pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). They also claimed that in
light of Dow's retraction no cause of action existed in the absence of a claim for special dam-
ages. While this is true under California law, the district court chose to apply New York law,
which holds the opposite. See O'Connor v. Field, 266 A.D. 121, 41 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1943)
(plaintiff was libeled by article characterizing him as a communist sympathizer since there
exists widespread public aversion to communism).
15. Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 100, 75 N.E.2d 257, 259 (1947) (retraction admissi-
ble only to reduce punitive damages, not compensatory damages).
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Mouthpiece" would have been understood by Barron's readers as defam-
atory.' 6 They all testified that the word "mouthpiece," when describing
an attorney, generally implies underworld criminality and lack of inde-
pendence, integrity and professional responsibility.' 7
Rudin offered the expert testimony of psychology professor Dr.
Robert Buckhout, who had conducted studies to determine readers' reac-
tion to "mouthpiece."'" Dr. Buckhout found that to a statistically signif-
icant degree all the respondents rated "mouthpiece" as more negative
than "spokesman."' 9
Rudin introduced dictionary entries that defined "mouthpiece" as a
criminal lawyer without integrity. He pointed to numerous examples of
the word's defamatory use in newspapers and other publications.2 °
Dow Jones & Co. was not to be outdone by Rudin's mass of evi-
dence. Dow also introduced expert testimony of a psychology professor.
Dr. Douglas Hermann's studies indicated that while "mouthpiece" was a
slightly negative term, when paired with "Sinatra" the negative connota-
tions were neutralized. 2'
Dow also presented testimony of a prominent journalist in support
of its contention that the use of "Sinatra's Mouthpiece" was consistent
with principles of reponsible journalism.22
Like Rudin, Dow introduced dictionary entries and examples of the
use of the term "mouthpiece" in publications. Not surprisingly their evi-
dence indicated that the primary meaning of the word was simply "one
who expressed another's view. "23
The court understandably found the two psychologists' results am-
biguous. The court reiterated that while "mouthpiece" may be generally
perceived as a negative term, to prevail in a defamation action it is neces-
16. Rudin, 557 F. Supp. at 538. Bruce Kauffman, former Justice of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, Peter Fleming, Jr., a partner in a New York City firm, and Paul Curran,
former United States Attorney, testified on Rudin's behalf.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 539. Respondents indicated their impression of an attorney referred to in study
no. I as "John Doe's Spokesman" or as "John Doe's Mouthpiece" and in study no. 2 as
"Sinatra's Spokesman" or as "Sinatra's Mouthpiece." Respondents recorded their impressions
by rating, on a scale of 1-7, the person on each of five different dimensions: just/unjust, clean/
dirty, advisor/puppet, honest/crooked, ethical/unethical.
19. Id. at 539-40.
20. Id. at 538, 545.
21. Id. at 541-42. Herrmann sent out questionnaires designed to determine the respon-
dent's evaluation of "mouthpiece" and "spokesman" in conjunction with certain occupations
and persons, e.g., "Pope John Paul's Mouthpiece" or "Charles Manson's Custodian."
22. Id. Michael J. O'Neill, former editor of the New York Daily News, testified on Dow's
behalf.
23. Id. at 545.
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sary to demonstrate that the word was actually understood by the reader
as defamatory - not just that the term was more negatively regarded
than a possible alternative.24 The studies did not address this crucial
question.
The court concluded that while the three attorneys' testimony pro-
vided direct evidence that the defamatory meaning of "mouthpiece" was
understood by them - and possibly other members of the legal commu-
nity - it certainly did not establish what Barron's readers understood.
25
The dictionary entries, articles and other evidence were likewise incon-
clusive.2 6 The court rejected Rudin's contention that defamation can be
established if even a small number of readers understood the word as
defamatory. 7 The court instead relied on more recent cases to reaffirm
that the ordinary and average reader's understanding is the standard.2 s
There is no general rule defining what works are defamatory; hence
each case turns on its own facts.2 9 Whether an idea injures a person's
reputation depends upon the opinions of those to whom it is published.
An alleged defamatory statement must be measured against what "right
thinking" people might think of it,3° or it must be opprobrious in the eyes
of a "considerable and respectable class in the community."3
In light of the contradictory and ambiguous evidence and testimony,
24. Id. at 543. See also Scheinblum v. Long Island Daily Press Pub. Co., 37 Misc. 2d
1015, 239 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1962), affd 18 A.D.2d 841, 239 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1963) (plaintiff not
libeled by article regarding arrest of person using plaintiffs name as an alias).
25. Rudin, 557 F. Supp. at 544.
26. Id. at 540-41, 543. Rudin also testified that he was personally humiliated by the cap-
tion. However, Steven Anreder and Alan Abelson, the editors of Barron's, testified as to the
appropriateness of the caption.
27. Id. at 543 n.7, citing Ben-Oliel v. The Press Publishing Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 167 N.E.
432 (1929) (plaintiff defamed only in the eyes of those with expert knowledge of Palestinian
culture).
28. Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 100, 75 N.E.2d 257, 259 (1947); James v. Gannett
Co., 40 N.Y.2d 415, 419, 353 N.E.2d 834, 837, 386 N.Y.S.2d 871, 874, (1976) ("Men is my
business" published in newspaper interview with dancer not defamatory); Everett v. Gross, 22
A.D.2d 257, 258, 254 N.Y.S.2d 561, 563 (1964) (article not defamatory to corporate plaintiff
since reader would have to possess special knowledge to form an adverse opinion).
29. Catalano v. Pechous, 69 Il1. App. 3d 797, 805, 387 N.E.2d 714, 721 (1978) (aldermen
not libeled by newspaper that printed defamatory statement without actual malice), afid, 83
Ill. 2d 146, 419 N.E.2d 350 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
30. Standards of "right thinking" vary from year to year and community to community.
For example, in England during the reign of Charles II it was actionable to call a man a
Roman Catholic although it would not be so today. Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal,
Inc., 262 N.Y. 99, 102, 186 N.E. 217, 220 (1933) (libel suit brought against newspaper for
printing woman was "courted by a murderer").
31. Ingalls v. Hastings & Sons Pub. Co., 204 Mass. 31, 33, 22 N.E.2d 657, 658-59 (1939)
(plaintiff libeled by newspaper that quoted him as making malicious statements against his
neighbor).
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the court was justified in holding that Rudin failed to sustain his burden
of demonstrating that Barron's average reader would have understood
"mouthpiece" to refer to a criminal lawyer lacking integrity. Conse-
quently, he failed to prove libel.
The court suggested that a more successful legal theory might have
involved proving Sinatra was associated with organized crime and
"mouthpiece" exploited that association. 2 Rudin, perhaps tactfully, did
not pursue this course. However, had the court reached the merits, Dow
was prepared to argue that since Rudin and Sinatra's relationship was a
matter within the sphere of legitimate public concern, Rudin was re-
quired to prove Dow acted with gross irresponsibility 33 - a conclusion,
Dow contended, not supported by the evidence.34 The court did not ad-
dress this issue and the standard of fault for defaming a private citizen is
only negligence.35
In Rudin, and in similar cases, an inordinate amount of time and
money was spent trying to prove what an ordinary and average reader
would understand. That standard by definition is subjective, changing,
and practically impossible to establish. As illustrated by Rudin, the gate-
ways were opened for floods of expert testimony by psychologists, jour-
nalists, linguists - all of whom, though certainly not claiming to
represent the "right thinking man," suggest that they are experts on how
one thinks. Direct proof of the necessary impact is also beset with diffi-
culties. The actual readers' testimony concerning their perception of the
libelous statement is never conclusive or even required. In fact some
courts refuse to even hear such testimony.36
The same result could have been reached more efficiently by apply-
ing simple principles of legal construction. For example, an almost uni-
versal construction rule is that particular words must be read in the
32. Rudin, 557 F. Supp. at 544.
33. The New York test in libel cases relating to publicity about matters of legitimate public
concern is that of "gross irresponsibility." Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38
N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975) (public school teacher assumed not to be
a public official).
34. Rudin, 557 F. Supp. at 546.
35. Although the test for defaming a public official or officer is actual malice, Rudin would
be considered a private citizen. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (per Powell,
J.), appealfiled, 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983). In Gertz a
prominent attorney had been libeled by a John Birch Society publication. The court held that
Gertz was not a "public figure" merely because the article was about a matter of public or
general interest or because Gertz was involved in a civil lawsuit.
36. 69 HARV. L. REV. 876, 884 (1956).
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context of the entire communication. 3 This rule should apply to head-
lines and captions as well.38 If this had been done in the Rudin case, it
would have been obvious from the start that Barron's had not defamed
Rudin. After all, the caption and letter read together present a fairly
harmless piece of journalism. At any rate, in the grey area between neu-
tral words and outright insults, the Rudin case illustrates just how diffi-
cult it can be to prove libel.
Tammy Kay Horton
37. Rose v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 213 F.2d 227, 228 (7th Cir. 1954) (article re-
garding accidental shooting not libelous).
38. Some courts construe headlines separately when they are prominent and lead the
reader to a conclusion entirely different from what the body of the story indicates. Sprouse v.
Clay Communications, Inc., 158 W. Va. 427, 211 S.E.2d 674, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975).
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